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CHAPTER IV

SECTION I
PANDORA'S BOX?
THE BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOING BUSINESS WITH
A SPACE STATION: AN INVENTORY OF PROBLEMS
Frans von der Dunk
Co-Director, International Institute of Air and Space Law, University of Leiden

1. Space Stations: a Journey Into The Unknown?
It is more than twenty-two years ago that US
astronaut Neil Armstrong was the first human being
to set foot on the moon and space of "one small step
for a man, one giant leap for mankind." No single
human endeavour in space has been able so far to
challenge fantasy and stir curiosity among the public
at large to such a great extent as the "Apollo 11"
mission of that July back in 1969. As a matter of fact,
sometimes one cannot escape the feeling that much of
spaceflight since, especially of the US American
brand, has been about beating the moon landing in
setting a yet more challenging, inspiring and grandiose target. So far, that has never been achieved.
Neither the space shuttles actually built nor the
aerospace planes to be developed, inside or outside
the United States, neither the "Mission to Planet
Earth" nor the "Mission to Mars" (via the Moon)
have been able to capture mankind's imagination to
any comparable extent.
Perhaps then another approach to the conquest of
space is indeed necessary, one not focussing on specific targets, spectacular moments and proud "firsts"
in space, but on a gradual evolution and expansion,
building experience upon experience in space which
makes human activities increasingly possible and
easy; not one step or leap, however giant, but a
continuing walking tour, a real journey. For certain
it will be a journey into the unknown in many respects, but that would not of course make it less
worthwhile or interesting.
The ultimate development in this respect is the one
concerning space stations. The first one, the Soviet
"Salyut-l."I) in 1971 provided for a human presence
in space of almost 24 days, which was only a rela-

tively moderate improvement in terms of time
compared to the "Soyuz-9" mission in 1970, which
stayed up for almost 18 days. The station itself,
launched in April 1971 and de-orbited in October of
the same year to burn up in the atmosphere, was
therefore uninhabited for the large part of its relatively speaking none too impressive lifetime. Yet, it
was the first step to create a living and working
environment in outer space, the next step being the
development of more permanent habitats and laboratories. The last of the Soviet "Salyut" stations,
"Salyut-7," launched in April 1982, witnessed a
record during 1984 of almost 237 days of human
presence; while the station itself, abandoned in 1986,
made an (uncontrolled) entry in February 1991 over
Argentina~)

Meanwhile, the United States had also entered the
arena: in May 1973 it had launched "Skylab," roughly twice the size of the "Salyut" stations. The latter
were actually no more than readjusted spacecraft,
which in a sense makes "Skylab" into the first 'real'
space station. "Skylab" received three visits, remaining uninhabited however during the larger part of its
lifetime, like the "Salyuts." It finally reentered the
atmosphere in June 1980, its debris touching down in
Australia. 3) Europe, in some ways the third spacepower, sent up its first "Spacelab" with the US space
shuttle in November 1983. "Spacelab" missions
however - to date there have been three more only lasted about a week apiece, thus contributing
relatively little to the development towards really
permanent human 'occupation' of space by means of
space stations.4)
Permanent habitats and laboratories in space are
not as spectacular as pioneering steps on a virgin
surface of course; arousing interest in the public at
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large and consequently being able to involve large
measures of government funds may therefore not be
as easy. Partly for this reason, the previous efforts at
least in regard of Spacelab were met with rather
'mixed enthusiasm.5) Partly for this reason also, the
international enterprise of realizing and operating an
international space station "Freedom" to last at least
30 years, with the United States, Japan, Canada and
ten member states of the European Space Agency
(ESA) as participating states, currently is in big
trouble. 6)
On the other hand, the only current example of a
(semi-permanent) habitat in space, the Soviet space
station "Mir"7) is, since Perestroika and Glasnost
have been gaining ground, increasingly becoming the
object of interest from a larger public than the space
community. The tests undertaken partly as a stunt
with Coca Cola on board "Mir," as well as the visit
to "Mir" of a Japanese journalist for over a week,
are the best examples thereof. Permanent habitats in
space moreover appeal to science fiction-geared
minds. It may well be that in hindsight the construction and operation of space stations will turn out to
be a more consequential, enticing and important
journey than even Neil Armstrong's giant leap for
mankind.
If it should turn out that way, it is clear that private
enterprise will have a very important role to play.8)
States, even the two still-leading space powers,
United States and whoever will replace the Soviet
Union in that respect, are becoming increasingly
reluctant to use government funds for these kinds of
long term, far-reaching projects, for all kinds of
political-budgetary reasons. Furthermore, financing
such space activities predominantly by government
would run contrary to the almost global tendency
towards capitalism and free market economics now
that communism is on the wane. And finally, on a
philosophical level as well, it would sound especially
illogical for states to try to develop space as a quasinormal environment for living and working by means
of permanent space stations when completely financing (and controlling) it as states themselves.
This is a crucial point, for it means that, indeed,
a number of arguments would plead for creation of
a regime as similar as possible to the circumstances in
which commercial enterprises operate on earth. After
all, it is the other way around as well: commercial
enterprises faced with multiple choices as to the

115

environments they could in theory operate in, will
certainly choose, for very earthly reasons, the most
favourable environment(s) for their activities, and in
the light of the factual problems regarding space
activities, it would already be a tremendous achievement to have commercial activities in space take place
in an environment very much resembling Mother
Earth in relevant aspects. In other words: for commercial enterprises to become interested in undertaking activities related to space stations, not single
leaps, but continuous progress is a fundamental
necessity. Nobody will turn down "a quick buck,"
but nobody will invest millions to obtain it. In this
respect, the unknown aspects should be reduced to
the absolute minimum possible, both legally and
otherwise. 9) At the same time, commercial enterprises themselves could contribute to making the
Unknown a little bit less unknown by their own
involvement, and make the Journey a little bit less
frightening. Analysis will be needed to make clear
whether by such activities a Box of Pandora is
opened which perhaps would better remain closed at
least for the time being, or whether the Journey looks
still worthy of continuation.
2. Commercialization, Private Enterprise and Space
Stations: the Non-Legal Parameters
For the above reasons it makes sense to take a
closer look at the commercial aspects of space stations and their legal implications. Before going into
more legal detail however, the non-legal parameters
of our problem, which are essentially three, should be
summarily sketched: they will turn out to have considerable impact on the legal framework also.
First, one should make an effort to define the term
"commercial." Basically to my mind "commercial"
points to the main motive of the activity in question
being that of making profits, even if only in the
longer term.J°) Thus, an undertaking can be called
commercial even if it is losing money, and even if that
loss is accepted for a certain amount of time, alternatively if that loss turns out to accompany the
undertaking during the whole of its time of life.
"Commercialization" of space activities consequently
means that the profit motive is becoming paramount
for undertaking those activities at all. Essentially it is
the motive which distinguishes commercial undertakings, e.g. in space, from scientific, military or
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(other) non-profit undertakings, where the main
motives are respectively to increase knowledge, to
realize the security of a political entity or to strive for
other non-material goals, but which of course sometimes turn out to realize profits on the side.
Second, in the context of "commercialization"
also the term "privatization" has often been used,
and although the relation between the two is indeed
one of close connection, they should not be confused. II ) "Privatization" should be defined as a
development where private, Le. non-governmental,
enterprise is becoming (more) active in certain fields
of society.12) It is thus based on an altogether
different criterion: it is not the motive for which an
activity is undertaken that counts in this respect, but
the actor of the undertaking concerned.
Therefore, private bodies may very well act for
non-commercial motives as much as for commercial
ones: the Red Cross, the National Academy of
Sciences, the Catholic or Protestant Churches and
the Society for the Protection of Animals are some of
the very different examples one can think of in this
respect. These kinds of entities, however, in view of
our topic will not be dealt with here.
Likewise, public bodies may very well act for
commercial reasons, as governments often are as
much (or even more) in need of money than private
entities. So when we deal with commercial aspects of
space activities in general, we have to keep in mind
that apart from private entities usually associated
with commercialization and commercial activities,
governmental or semi-governmental entities are also
involved. At the same time, private entities provide
for a good focus as the commercial motive, when it
is present, is almost invariably clearly the most important, whereas in the instance of government activities, the commercial motive is usually much harder
to distinguish and set aside from other motives.
Private enterprise, for the very reason of their being
non-state bodies in a primarily still state-oriented
legal environment, are the best vehicles for an
analysis of the legal aspects of commercialization. l3)
That commercial activities as such, even if undertaken by private entities, are allowed under space
law, may by now be taken for granted. 14)
It is important finally to come back once more to
the definition of commercialization and its intricate
link with privatization. In order to understand the
particular form of commercialization in relation to

space activities, one should remain aware on the
practical level of the basic distinction between the two
necessary corollary elements of any commercialization, buyers of goods and services, and sellers of the
same (amongst whom of course also are the original
producers of the goods and providers of the services),
who among themselves conclude transactions regarding those goods and services. Every space activity
really consists of an intricate web or chain of many
entities, most of whom thus turn out to be buyers and
sellers in regard of different products and services at
the same time. Nevertheless it should be kept in mind
that if one speaks of privatization within the framework of commercialization, this really means that in
respect of the relevant goods and services private
enterprise is allowed to act as buyer, or seller, or both.
The theoretical standard of a totally private market
presupposes nothing else than that all buyers and
sellers are private entities. 15 ) It may already be stated
that a rather mixed picture emerges as to the actors
in commercial activities in outer space, although
governments nevertheless play a dominant role in
most respects, and relatively few of the big transactions take place between buyers and sellers who are
both non-governmental.
Third, when turning to the specific issue of space
stations next, a few more basic elements should be
kept in minde. The unique aspects of space stations,
when compared to other kinds of space activities,
derive from the fact that they are intended as (semi-)
permanently habitable space objects,16) Other space
objects are either (semi-)permanent but uninhabited,
such as satellites; or expendable and unmanned, such
as launching rockets themselves; or even manned but
either expendable (in the sense of being able to operate only for the duration of one trip) such as the lunar
modules or re-usable (but still returning to earth only
days after departure) such as spaceshuttles and
aerospace planes.
This fundamental characteristic firstly makes
space stations into large and complex structures,
which have to be assembled in space and thereby need
more than one launching.17) A second consequence
of permanent habitability is that the factual status of
space stations is not any longer similar to that of
transport vehicles, so far the only manned space
objects, but becomes much more akin to that of an
area of a state. Thirdly, due to its fundamental goal
of copying the earth's living environment in an outer
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space area, it is a much more logical vehicle for all
kinds of commercial activities which as such have
little or nothing to do with space activities.
And fourthly and finally, because of the complexity of the undertaking of operating a space station,
and the expensiveness thereof, such undertakings will
usually be internationalized to an even greater extent
than with respect to other space endeavours. "Freedom," to be built and operated by 13 states, their
space agencies and companies, of course is the best
example of such internationalization. But also the
case of "Mir" is relevant in this regard, as the
economic situation in the former Soviet Union,
which is moreover enhanced by the political situation, makes international participation and investments particularly welcome.
In short, in many respects space stations, if not
already by now, at least in the light of their ultimate
goal and purposes, show a great similarity to floating
pieces of human environment, accidentally happening to be far away from normal human environments
- rather than to transport vehicles intended for short
term specific purposes and with passengers all having
one simple goal: to become transported to the place
of destination.
3. Captains or Kings? - The Basic Legal Framework for Space Stations

The aforementioned non-legal parameters are very
relevant for the basic legal framework for space stations. This will become even clearer when we turn to
the legal implications of the commercial aspects of
space stations. It is submitted that, partly for reasons
enumerated above, it is essential to concentrate on
such a framework first, while secondly, without in
any way claiming to be exhaustive, a few clearly
relevant legal areas will be scrutinized to some greater
extent. Thus the following approach suggests itself.
When one tries to analyze the legal aspects of commercial activities - whether private or public within the non-legal framework dealt with above, it
is tantamount to saying one should concentrate on
what law applies in a way in personam to the buyer
and the seller, and in term to the transactions they
conclude, which includes the product or service itself
and consequently, as an example, product-liability or
what is effectively liability for the damage caused by
activities respectively.
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In other words, it would be logical to ask the following questions. First: what jurisdiction, meaning
the sum of the respective powers to proscribe law
through legislative action and to enforce law through
executive and judicial action,18) apply to a certain
buyer or seller who undertakes a transaction in relation to the space station. Second: what law applies
and what courts are competent, to judge on conflicts
related to the transactions, whether under contract
law or under tort law. 19)
How to deal with these questions? As the ultimate
purpose of creating space stations is the creation of
a semi-normal living and working environment in
space, the point of departure for analysis of such a
framework should thus be as closely related to the
earthly situation as possible. On earth, law systems
can be basically divided into the body of international law and the various national, domestic legal
systems; states, being the subjects of the one and the
sovereigns of the other, forming the pivotal link and
at the same time the borderline between the two.
Thus, international law deals with states, and a still
rather limited number of exceptions aside, with states
only, whereas it is the national law of one state or
other which regulates the daily life of those people
and entities falling within its scope and the workings
of society, economy and policy of that state.
When it comes to potential conflicts between international law and national law, basically international
law rules supreme ,20) although the fact has almost
been removed from public consciousness because,
first, the rules of international law are not nearly as
well-established, generally accepted and elaborated
as are those of national systems, and, second, the
basic tenet of international law and its most fundamental principle of sovereignty of states is a pervasive
one: unless clear proof of the contrary exists, states
are free under international law to act as they like.
Nevertheless, all domestic legislation can be seen in
theory as filling in the framework provided for by
international law.
This basic legal framework for all human activity
on earth has important consequences for commercial
private enterprise and their activities. It means first,
as far as such activities are purely internal from a
state's point of view, that public international law
basically leaves it to the state in question to regulate
those activities legally or otherwise - or indeed, not
to regulate them. As soon as international elements
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become involved, either as personae or as res, this
situation changes. Public international law does not,
usually, accept enterprises as subjects of international
law, of international rights and obligations. What it
does, is partially applied principles of state responsibility, such as due care responsibility, and jurisdiction, where the territorially-based jurisdiction usually
is seen as overriding jurisdiction otherwise based2l);
and for the rest allow states to establish their own
systems of what is called private international law,
dealing domestically with potentially applicable
foreign jurisdictions, and to conclude agreements
among themselves relating to these matters.
Transposing this analysis to outer space in general
first, basically similar results appear. The focus here
inevitably lies on public international law, which thus
forms the basic framework for any commercial use
of outer space.22) Further elaboration, which is
sometimes provided for nationally, will therefore not
be dealt with to any great extente in this essay.
A third venue which can be taken in respect of
outer space specifically to fill in the framework is that
which is sometimes called "astro-Iaw,"23) a body of
rules yet to be developed as a kind of private law for
outer space. Such a system would effectively mean
turning outer space into some kind of extraterrestrial
territory which is under control not of a single sovereign state but falls under the sovereignty of the, or
a, community of states. As any such law system
moreover can only be subsidiary to the public international law-framework, the states implementing the
former themselves being subjects of the latter, it will
only come to the fore wherever relevant in the latter's
context, just as is the case with domestic legal systems.
In the light of the non-legal parameters discussed
before, it would be even more logical to apply this
analysis to the specific issues of space stations.
Indeed, it will turn out in a way to be applicable, since
a legal perception of space stations as quasi-territory
of one state or another (or, if the case might arise, of
a community of states) would be in line both with
their meta-goal of creating permanent habitats in
space, and with the concurrent issue of interesting
and involving commercial and indeed private enterprise in these undertakings.
This would, firstly, relate well to the size and
complexity-issue relating to space stations, which
means that the definition and relevance of the term
"space object" under space law24) will be seen to

have gained a special importance, as parts of a space
station can be considered as a space object of its own
or only as a component part of a space object, depending upon the circumstances.25)
It would, secondly, be logical in view of the semiterritorial nature of space stations. Legally, that
would mean increasing the factual importance of the
consequences of registration under space law,26) such
as jurisdiction and control. Related issues of liability
will tend to get overlooked, as the notion of "launching" and consequently of "launching state"27) will
tend to become irrelevant, especially if the space
station is already active for a long time.
Thirdly, as a consequence of space stations' goals
in terms of their normality as a working environment
and the consequent possibilities of all kinds of commercial activities, those activities could have little or
no relevance from a space law-point of view, and yet
are dealt with or will have to be dealt with legally at
any rate. The sale on board of a space station by one
member of a crew of a photo camera to another
member has not much to do with space law, yet in
principle has to be dealt with legally.
And fourthly, the tendency towards internationalization once more brings jurisdictional questions to
the forefront, as in principle different jurisdictions
will be at stake.28) Possibly, use can be made with
respect to these issues, whether by analogy or directly,
of the principles e.g. concerning private international
law, presently existing on earth. The fundamental
issue as it relates to international space stations here
is the concurrent existence especially of the quasiterritorial jurisdiction of the state of registry of (part
of) the space station and the personal jurisdiction of
another state over its nationals happening to be
present in that (part of the) space station.
As to the other two non-legal parameters discussed
before, they would call for the same use of territory
and its legal complement of jurisdiction. Commercial
activities, the motive being the only criterion distinguishing them from other activities, can take all dif-·
ferent forms; the commercial motive merely means
that it concerns production of a good or provision of
a service somehow undertaken in return for payments estimated to at least offset costs of production
or provision. From a legal point of view, thus "production," "provision" and related "contract" (or
other agreement) are the three key-words which the
framework will have to deal with.
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"Production" of goods takes place somewhere,
and usually falls therefore in rem under some kind of
territorial jurisdiction as to e.g. taxation and productliability. The commercial motive may at a certain
stage make it interesting or even adamant that the
place of production is somewhere else; territorial
jurisdiction shifts with it. Would it not then be
logical, to apply this, by creating a system of quasiterritorial jurisdiction, to a shift of production to
outer space as well?
It must be added, that as to production, territorial
jurisdiction can also apply to the producer instead of
the product, once more through the place of production, although here other principles of jurisdiction,
notably that based on nationality, and thus in a way
in personam, could also come into play. Taxation for
instance can fall in this category as well.
As to "provision" of services, mutatis mutandis
the same applies; although it is sometimes much
harder to point to a specific place where the provision
takes place - does an international bank transferring
Dutch guilders on an account held in Amsterdam into
Japanese yens on an account held in Tokyo provide
its service in the Netherlands or in Japan? -, on
earth interplay of the various potentially applicable
jurisdictions, whether territorially or nationallybased, whether really in personam or in rem, has
been taken care of in general by the existence of
bodies of private international law, where public
international law provides the first choice for one
domestic system of private international law or
another, usually through the lex loci making the
territorial jurisdiction decisive. 29)
The relevant "contracts" likewise are regulated by
a body of private international law, public internationallaw usually making the first choice guided by
territorial jurisdiction, although a caveat must be
made here. The contracting parties, after all, can
decide among themselves to deviate in many ways
from basic principles such as those mentioned before.
The paramount issue in this respect, of dispute settlement in case the contract, or the product or service it
deals with, becomes the object of serious disagreement, has two sides: that of applicable legal system(s)
as to the interpretation of the contract and the consequences of, and judgement on, the dispute itself,
and that concerning which court or courts have jurisdiction over contract, consequences and dispute. 3D)
Both issues are often taken care of in the contract
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itself, the territorial basis for jurisdiction through
public international law coming into play only subsidiarily thereto. In general, it once more seems
logical to equate space stations in law to pieces of
territory, for the purpose of dealing with commercial
activities related thereto.
Privatization finally directly deals with the role of
states and their jurisdiction, primarily based on
territory - and secondarily on nationality.3l) The essence of privatization being the creation of non-state
entities, the question arises under space law as well as
under general international law, as to their place
under that law. Space law, so far generally stateoriented, provides for a dual solution through its
liability- and responsibility-regimes.32) The liabilityregime uses the territorial principle by making a state
liable for damage caused by a space object launched
by whomsoever from its territory or facility,33)
whereas the responsibility-regime basically uses the
national principle by speaking of "national activities,"
"whether carried out by governmental agencies or
non-governmental entities."34) The problem remains
however that the liability-regime only deals with one
important aspect of commercial activities, including
those of private entities, namely that of· damage
caused somehow in relation to those activities,
whereas the responsibility-regime is often seen as a
very general principle, without further elaboration
hardly capable of regulating every detail of e.g.
commercial activities of private enterprise. In order
not to make commercial activities (whether undertaken by private or public entities) on space stations
unduly different from similar or identical activities
down on earth, and for the purpose of a comprehensive and logical approach to privatization in regard to
outer space, it seems best once more to transfer the
territorial principle as far as possible to space stations
being an alternative to earth as a place to do business.
Therefore, one thing seems to have become clear:
that, in order to try to deal with all the different
commercial aspects of space stations within one
coherent and comprehensive legal framework, it is
necessary to start equating space stations to pieces of
territory, and then to try to analyze the deviations
thereof and the consequences and relevance of those
deviations. In legal terms: the framework should
have a king at its head, a (quasi-)sovereign with all
related legal powers, and not a captain, merely
equipped with those powers necessary to reach the
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next destination in rather good order.
Let us therefore approach the problem of analyzing the legal aspects of commercialization of space
stations in this way, as that will clarify to the greatest
extent possible the achievements and shortcomings of
the legal regime as it exists today. Partly for this
reason as well, it becomes logical as a starting point
to deal with the first of the basic issues relating to
space stations: the earthbound phase of each space
station's life before taking off towards outer space;
a phase moreover which indeed has important legal
aspects relevant for commercialization in respect of
space stations.
4. Producers and Products - Legal Aspects in
Regard of the Pre-Operational Phase
It has already been argued that the undertaking to
build a space station as (semi-)permanent living and
working quarters is a very challenging and special
endeavour indeed. This already applies to the first
phase, which still takes place on earth, where a wellestablished body of private internationallaw35) regulates the potential clashes that would arise out of
differing or divided answers to these questions. A
Dutch company selling a manufactured piece of
equipment to a French one, the contract stipulating
Swiss law to be applied to it, and next getting into
some dispute regarding the deal, more or less knows
to what extent Dutch, French and Swiss laws apply
both in personam and in rem.
Legal aspects of commercialization indeed become
already apparent in this phase, the pre-operational
phase of development and construction on earth.
Although development, pointing mainly to drawing
tables and computer calculations, and construction,
pointing mainly to turning lathes and assembly
rooms, could of course be seen as two different
phases, I take them together. The main element in
both subphases for the purpose of my analysis is the
fact that all these activities, and consequently the
transactions involving the products which are to form
part of a space station and the services necessary to
realize the building thereof, are taking place on earth,
and their direct effects remain confined to the earth.
This means that those commercial transactions
indeed are of little relevance from the point of space
law as opposed to general international law, as there
is simply territorial jurisdiction of some state or other

applicable. If the German government in the framework of ESA's contribution "Columbus" to space
station "Freedom," contracted MBB-ERNO to
manufacture a part of "Columbus," the contract
would simply be regulated by relevant German
laws. 36) Likewise, MBB-ERNO's contract with a
German subcontractor would be ruled by such laws.
Liability between the two parties for instance, in
respect of damage caused by activities or services as
much as by defective products, would be regulated by
German law; at least, it has been exluded from the
operation of Article 16 of the IGA37) and does not
fall under the scope ofe the Liability Convention
either. To begin with, the concept of damage there
only deals with "loss of life, personal injury or other
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to
property (... )"; mere liability for breach of contract
e.g. seems not to be included thereby.38) Furthermore,
the Convention clearly deals with international
claims, even if in the first instance only two entities
are involved.39)
In case these commercial transactions turn out to
be international, because buyer(s) and seller(s) are
from (at least) two different states, this merely means
that private international law comes into play in
order to deal with the question what jurisdiction to
what extent is to be given priority in a given case. If
MBB-ERNO were thus to contract the Dutch Fokkercompany, the place of contract or stipulations within
the contract would make either German of Dutch (or
in some instances a third country's) law apoplicable
- just as much as when Fokker would provide an
airlock for an Airbus aircraft, instead of a pressurized "Columbus" module. Once more, the IGA
does not provide for a specific piece of what could be
called "astro-law"40) in this regard, apart from the
issue of liability for all sorts of damage, which is
excluded by the specific cross waiver regime of the
IGA.41) Mutatis mutandis, the same would hold
good for tort disputes.
Consequently, the only relevance of such international transactions not being doubly-private but
involving government entities either as seller(s) or as
buyer(s) or both, is potential application of the
general public international law-doctrine of state
immunity.42) The application itself however is provided for once more by domestic laws; with regard to
international transactions once more private internationallaw providing for the choice of law. Thus, if it
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was the German government contracting Fokker to
provide an airlock, and consecutively a dispute were
to arise related to this contract, either German or
Dutch law would decide whether Germany could
elaim state immutity or not.
It may be added, that such transactions will by
nature (selling or buying of products or services) as
much as by purpose (the realization of a specific kind
of space activity, more precisely the creation of a
space station) be of a "jure gestionis" character.43 )
Only in case therefore courts are still applying the
principle of absolute state immunity will companies
or other states becoming commercially involved with
such a state really run a special risk, namely that of
not having contractual obligations to them honoured
by such a state, and not being able to have such
obligations enforced in court.
There remains one type of case to be dealt with
here, where totally earthbound commercial transactions can have implications with regard to space law:
the problem of product liability.44) The mixed nature
of the commercialization in this respect becomes
clear, as "[s]pacecraft ( ... ) are chiefly manufactured
by private corporations, a rule which certainly
applies in the USA; they are, however, usually owned
by the State."45) Owned by a state or not, once the
spacecraft or object is launched into outer space and
then proceeds to cause damage as defined under
space law, the state(s) which come(s) under the heading of launching state46) become liable for such
damage.
Thus, producers of defective products, even if they
are sold to other entities, can make a state which in
the end launches or procures the launching of the
object, or from whose territory or facility the object
is launched, liable for the damage. It then depends
once more upon the domestic law of the state involved (or, concerning international transactions, the
domestic laws of the states involved plus relevant
rules of private international law making a choice
between those), whether states have some kind of
recourse once their liability has been invoked on an
international level. Likewise, the questions as to what
extent various producers within a chain of producers
each contributing their own production-plus-assembly
actions to an intricate and complex end product such
as (a part of) a space station can incur product liability for the end product turning out to be defective,
is a question of the domestic law(s) of the state(s)
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involved, and, where relevant, rules of private international law.
"Freedom" in this respect does not really provide
for an exception, although the lGA in Article 16 concerning cross waiver of liability effectively includes
all kinds of product liability.47) Under the terms of
the lGA, however, for example damage incurred by
the German government, because of use of a defective Japanese element in its contribution to "Columbus," does not fall under the cross waiver because,
for the purpose of Article 16 of the lGA, the Japanese
manufacturer would be a related entity of Germany
and not of Japan.48) Thus, such damage could indeed
be claimed from the manufacturer by Germany
through other, applicable, liability-rules - i.e.
German ones.
Other elements of law important for commercial
enterprises as to this phase, specific agreements
between relevant states e.g. in the franiework of the
European Space Agency or the European Communities taken aside, are also simply dealt with by domestic law systems, and, under circumstances, private
international law. Examples here are taxation questions and anti-trust laws.49)
Thus, it is very easy indeed to see that territorial
jurisdiction is the fundamental basis of every particular legal regime and therefore provides in itself the
basic legal framework for the earth-based phases of
space station-undertakings.
5. Who Pays the Damage? - Legal Aspects in
Regard of Liability and the Launching Regime
A specific kind of legal regime appertains to the
next phase any space station has to pass through: the
launching phase of the various parts of any space
station, and although it does not solely relate to this
phase,50) it is more prominent and relevant here. It is
a regime already mainly provided for by space law or at least one specific part of space law: the liability
regime. This, consequently, will also apply to any
commercialization to be fOund in the 'industry' or
'business' of launching. Here, the basic dichotomy of
privatization in relation to commercialization, concerning sellers and buyers respectively, becomes
apparent, for private entities may be seen to become
involved both in providing launching services and in
using them.
Liability, of course, is an important legal aspect of
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any activity, commercial or not, private or not, and
the same holds good in space. To what extent certain
activities are seen as potentially profitable, and therefore would be undertaken commercially, depends
partly on the consequences of that activity causing
damage,51) i.e. the extent to which such damage
could or should be compensated.
The liability regime in a way is the exception to the
rest of space law, which is basically applicable either
to outer space52) or specific parts of outer space
(such as the moon and celestial bodies,53) or to
activities which are in such a way defined that they
either take place in outer space itself, or are almost
exclusively focussed on outer space (such as the
registration obligations for space objects). As the
Liability Convention makes clear, its regime applies
to damage occasioned during the launching as well,
so that it also covers these parts of the launching
which take place on earth and in the air spacetrajectory to outer space. It even applies to launched
objects which never reach outer space as it also covers
attempted launching?4)
On the providing side, since a number of years
ago, the launching of space objects has become one
of the most commercialized and privatized fields of
space activities. In the United States, apart from
NASA, the governmental space agency involved
more or less as a spider in the web, for a number of
years private corporations such as Martin Marietta,
Hughes and McDonnell Douglas have offered their
rockets to carry satellites to various orbits, in a
competitive and commercial manner. In Europe, the
semi-privatized company of Arianespace has in the
ten years or so of its existence even grabbed at least
40070 of the commercial launcher market. And both
the Former Soviets republics, desperately looking for
money and a way to help restructure their economy,
and the Chinese Government, also keen on hard
currency, have started to offer their launching services for very competitive prices.55)
Before we try to analyze the legal aspects of commercialization in this respect however, it must be
noted first that their relevance for the issue of space
stations is at the moment fairly limited. The buyers
of commercial launching services from providers
such as those listed above, are mainly those wishing
to operate satellites for telecommunication or remote
sensing activities, the only other two fields of space
activities where commercialization may be said to

have had a considerable impact already. As the space
station's parts to be launched are in the end provided
by states through their spacee agencies (thus nonprivate) and any financial return or money in the
space station is on the short term out of the question
and on the longer term still hihghly uncertain, the
commercial motive so far plays an unimportant part
in these launchings.
The buyers of these launching services will tend to
look therefore at other aspects from. the cost of one
launcher as compared to another, such as reliability
(technical as well as organizational), or, due to the
complex nature of any space station project, the
advantages of having a command structure as simple
as possible, i.e. as much as possible within one body.
And, indeed, the elements of "Freedom" are to be
launched on the US space shuttle.56) For the moment,
Hermes, yet to be realized, is planned only to launch
the Man-Tended Free Flyer, an ESA-project not part
of the permanent core of "Freedom." On the one
hand, its realization has come under considerable
doubt, on the other hand, if the space shuttle is going
to encounter still more problems, it may at sometime
in the future even be called upon to perform stand-in
services - for instance, when ESA would decide to
go ahead with its own elements of "Freedom" after
some restructuring and in partnership with other
states also willing to press forward in that sense.
And direct commercial involvement in the launchings even by private entities57) could become a reality,
if the current trend of restructuring and budget
cutting is going to hit both space shuttle and Hermesprogrammes. The trende towards capitalism and free
market economy in (formerly) communist countries
and governmental financial problems in (already)
capitalist countries may well force increasing involvement of private expendable launch vehicle-operators
acting for profits. Hence, it is still interesting to look
into the structure of legal rules in respect of launch.ings of (parts of) space stations.
On the using side, it seems unlikely that entities
with commercial motives, public or private, will in
the near future use launching services in respect of
planned activities related to space stations, whether
those launching services are provided commercially
or not, by government or by private enterprise. The
outlook e.g. for doing business on the international
space station at all is too grim for that,58) whereas
dong business on "Mir" already at first sight seems

von der Dunk in Legal Aspects of Space Commercialization (1991): 114-138.
Copyright 1991, by Frans von der Dunk. Used by permission.

SECTION I

to be equivalent to taking vast and unknown risks in
legal and other terms. Entities looking for profits in
space activities which need to use launching services
can get far better value for money by getting involved
·in telecommunications or remote sensing. Nevertheless, that may of course change. If Coca Cola has
made a lot of money with its advertisement on "Mir,"
next time they may think of doing bigger, and buy
someone's launching services. At the moment, the
owners of "Mir," whoever they are, are earning some
US$15-20 million for each foreign guest making a
short trip to "Mir"; from their point of view it is
definitely worthwhile.
Commercialization in respect of provision, or in
respect of use of launching services basically however
does not differ much, as far as liability is concerned.
In all such cases, basically the Liability Convention59)
contains the international legal framework relevant
thereto. It may be considered binding upon even
those states who did not ratify it, as it is supposed to
be an elaboration merely of Article III of the Outer
Space Treaty, the 'Magna Carta' of space law.
The Liability Convention provides for liability for
damage for what is called the "launching state,"60)
and precedes this by defining it in basically four
different ways. Thus, a state becomes liable for
damage if it is the state that launches the object
causing the damage, the state that procures that
launching, the state from whose territory it has been
launched or the state from whose facility it has been
launched.61 ) As, moreover, launchings undertaken
within the framework of, or by, intergovernmental
organizations do not in any way exclude liability for
the member states of that international organization,62) in theory an unlimited number of states can
become liable for damage by the object launched.
What is the relevance of this regime for commercial undertakings in respect of space stations? As far
as they are public, it means of course that, so far,
states launching or procuring the launching, or even
offering their launching facility or territory for hire
for launches, of parts of space stations, can become
liable for damage caused by such part of a space
station. It is important to note this seeming obviousness, because it tends to get forgotten once the space
station is settled and well in operation. The extension
here of e.g. territorial jurisdiction, as a consequence
of the definition of "launching state," seems almost
automatic, and domestic filling-in almost obligatory,
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while at the same time it does not acknowledge
separate status of the space station or its parts as
(quasi-)territory, because the territorial link of the
launching still rules supreme. It is as if Dutch aircraft
flying to Canada must still be considered for all
liability purposes as being an extention of Dutch
territory, even while at the gates of Montreal Airport.
This last conclusion is underscored by actual facts
in two ways. First, usually a state that launches itself
does so from its own territory or facility, only in case
of procurement is the use of 'foreign' launch sites a
common phenomenon. And second, in case of more
than one launching state becoming involved, the
launching-contracts explicitly take care of derogation
or eventual damages being claimed from the state
whose territory or facility is used, whereas it is usually that state which is appointed registration state.63 )
That the Soviet government, respectively its successor as a state, is still liable under the Liability
Convention as a launching state for any damage that
might have occurred in Argentine territory caused by
the falling down of debris from its Salyut-7 station in
February 1991, even though the actual launch had
taken place almost nine years earlier, may still be
considered logical. However, likewise, in theory
European states, even those contributing a small
portion to ESA's "Columbus" budget and thus coprocuring the launching, could be held liable if the
international space station "Freedom" is going to deorbit some 30 years from now and causes damage by
doing so. If the de-orbiting has been occasioned by
actions on the US module it would be much more
logical in view of the quasi-territoriality of the US
module and the related US jurisdiction to hold the
United States liable, as a corollary of its jurisdiction
which means that it is either culpable itself or has
jurisdiction to try the culprits, than those European
states.
In regard of private enterprise becoming involved
in the launchings of parts of space stations, it will
usually be the state from whose territory the part is
launched, that will be liable if damage is occasioned
thereby. Even if the launching itself is undertaken
and also paid for (i.e. procured) by one or more
private companies, i.e. involving both a private seller
and a private buyer, and the launching facility is also
operated by a private entity, the state whose territory
witnesses the launching will be liable.64)
This has two important consequences. First, it
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would mean that (only) in case of launches as described just before from facilities outside any
national territory (read: jurisdiction), for instance
from a platform on the high seas, no state can be held
liable under the Liability Convention - unless one
could argue that a state has a duty to prevent its
nationals (juridical or otherwise) to organize or
participate in launchings for which no state could be
held liable. In other words: states would be really
under a due care responsibility for their nationals. 65 )
Thus, any claim based on damage should be broght
on the basis of the responsibility of states for their
national activities, including those of non-governmental entities.66)
That such a claim might very well succeed in
principle if the seller, i.e. the launch provider, is a
national of the state held responsible, seems clear. In
regard of the state of natinality of a buyer of launch
services things may perhaps seem to lie differently.
Can one hold a state responsible if one of its nationals allows himself to have his satellite launched by a
national of another state, outside any state's territorial jurisdiction on a private facility?67) If the
system is to be watertight, that question should also
be answered in the affirmative.
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides for
such a responsibility for national activities, Le.
usually considered as based upon the link of nationality, with concurring authorization and continuing
supervision being offered as instruments as far as
activities in outer space are concerned. Other activities relevant for outer space fall by definition within
one territorial sovereignty or other (except of course
if undertaken on the high seas or some parts of
Antarctica) as well as under one national sovereignty
or other.
Whether the state thus in the end held responsible
for the international wrongful act of not preventing
damage from being caused by a national activity, has
any recourse against the private entity really causing
the damage, depends on national legislation. For
completeness' sake, it must perhaps be added that in
this respect the term "national activities" should also
be seen to apply to a permanent resident of the
appropriate state in case the person in question has
no nationality at all: a stateless person launching
from the high seas or unclaimed parts of Antarctica
could thus still indirectly create some sort of liability
for one state or another.

It is my opinion that territorial application of
Article VI, not through the territory from which the
space station is launched but through perceiving in
law the space station as a piece of territory of its own
and all activities taking place on board to be national
activities, would solve the aforementioned problems
concerning seeming inapplicability and illogicality of
application of the liability-regime through the launching state-notion. Such a perception would, both
through Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and
through general public international law, create
quasi-territorial jurisdiction as a counterpart to the
general international responsibility for national
activities, which is jurisdiction based on territoriality
as much as (or rather even more than) on nationality.
It would also have the advantage of partitioning
liability-through-responsibility along logical lines in
case of both provider and user of the launching
service being private entities. The national activities
for which the state of nationality of the former would
then remain responsible, e.g. if damage occurs,
would be the launching activities, whereas the state of
nationality of the latter would become responsible
for all activities of the space object that was launched
after it had started to function, Le. after the launching phase had really ended.
The seconde consequence of the definition of
launching state for the commercial activities of private ,entities relates closely to those last remarks.
Private entities under international space law cannot
be held internationally liable; in case of damage being
caused by their activities, it is one state or other that
is going to be presented with claims.68) In the case
mentioned before, it is the state from whose territory
the relevant (part of the) space station is launched,
even if it does not more than having the launching
take place on its territory. Once more, for these states
it depends upon their respective nationallegisl~tions,
to what extent those claims can be derogated to the
entities actually causing the damage.
And indeed, some states, notably the United
States, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have
already provided for national space legislation to
derogate liability claims in respect of launches from
their territory, or alternatively by their nationals.69)
Elsewhere, it would need extensive research into the
various national legal systems, in order to clarify to
what extent domestic laws not (specifically) aimed at
space activities could still provide for such derogation.
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Generally speaking, it may be said that the
liability-regime uses territorial jurisdiction as the
foremost basis for dealing with launchings. As far as
!he launching phase itself is concerned, this seems a
logical and convenient mode of operation. In regard
of space stations, in regard of the multiplicity of
functions, states and entities involved, and activities
possible, and in regard of the projected life spans, for
the operational phase this seems to be far less logical
and convenient. Instead, space stations once more
will probably best be seen as "territory" themselves,
creating their own "territorial jurisdiction." That
brings us to the next phase, that of operation of the
sapce station in question. While it has to be kept in
mind, that the space law-regime of liability remains
relevant thereto as well, this specific regime will not
be dealt with concerning the operational phase: the
analysis provided so far nevertheless, mutatis mutandis, still applies to that phase.
6. Mine or Thine? - Legal Aspects in Regard
of the Operational Phase
Any space station's operational phase is the most
peculiar in legal terms, as it is here that the space
station's unique elements and characteristics are
being shown most clearly. As already mentioned, the
main characteristic of being designed for long-time
human habitation effectively would turn any space
sation into a kind of floating piece of territory. No
longer would it simply qualify as a transport vehicle
under space law with "launching" as the most important fact basically providing for legal consequences
- despite the fact that for example the present
liability regime is still based on this notion, unless
specific arrangements have been made.
Thus, here in particular, the question arises as to
what extent the ultimate authority on board would
not be any longer a kind of captain, mainly involved
in making travelling decisions, but instead a kind of
king - or at least his deputy - making all kinds of
decisions as to what happens on board just as if,
indeed, if concerned a piece of territory. The question
has already been summarily dealt with in generaPO)
As to this specific issue, the question then would
follow as to whom a space station or a specific part
thereof would "belong": is it mine, so that my
jurisdiction aplies, or is it thine?
If the juridical framework for everything happen-
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ing on space stations or their parts and more basically
for providing answers to the question "mine or
thine?" would best be provided by the same rules as
it has been done down on earth, let us indeed start
with earthly international law principles. They entail
first and foremost the delegation of jurisdiction to
one territorial sovereign or other, and only next the
designation of specific legal regimes for pieces of
land or sea happening to fall outside any territorial
sovereignty (be they either "terra nullius" or "terra
communis," or even a special form of the latter called
"common heritage of mankind."7!)
Territorial sovereignty, however, according to
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,72) does not
apply to outer space, and Article I even suggests outer
space to be something akin to the common heritage
of mankind.73) On the other hand, that of course
would not mean that any space object, whether part
of a space station or not, is really no-man's land or
a commonality,74)
As is the case in sea law with respect to ships on
the high seas75 ) and in air law with respect to airplanes in airspace over those high seas,76) space law
provides for a kind of quasi-territorial jurisdiction
through a registration regime,77) Article III of the
Outer Space Treaty provides the core element of this
registration regime; whereas in sea law and air law
jurisdiction is closely related to nationality,78) Article
VIII provides for jurisdiction (and control) over a
space object belonging to a launching state. The
Registration Convention goes on to detail that provision: in case there is only one launching state, that
state is obliged to register the object and thereby
become its state of registry; in case two or more states
qualify as launching states, one of them should be
jointly determined to become its registration state.79)
In any case, the state of registry through its exercise of jurisdiction and control80) really becomes
quasi-territorially quasi-sovereign over the space
object. Quasi-territorially, because it is of course not
really territory as such, which means that once it
would fall down on real territory, any fiction of
territoriality would cease to exist and the only territoriality which would remain in play would be that of
the state on whose territory the space object would
have fallen down. Quasi-sovereign, because especially in case more than one launching state is involved,
jurisdiction (and control) cannot be apportioned
automatically, and for instance could be shared on
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agreement between the launching states involved. 8!)
This all, of course, becomes especially relevant in
respect of space stations. With space stations having
a single launching state (and therefore, by definition,
only one state who can become the state of registry,
thus having full jurisdiction and control automatically), the situation is relatively simple. National law
would apply, as far as it is expressly or impliedly
extended to space stations in outer space, as a consequence of the legislative part of jurisdiction,82) and
would regulate all legal aspects of doing business.
Thus, tax laws could apply, as they are usually based
on the territorial principle for (legislative) jurisdiction 83); or antitrust law, likewise usually based on
territorial criteria.84) Both, moreover, could be
construed either in personam or in rem, once more
depending upon national application.
In case of international involvement, of a French
astronaut visiting "Mir," either specific arrangements would need to deal with the jurisdictional issue
and thus with the legal framework for commercial
activities - whether private or not -, or the law of
the state of registry would apply quasi-territorially.85)
Bringing Article VI of the Outer Space 'freaty in line
with this situation, i.e. making the Sovietr Union
respectively its successor responsible as a state for
everything happening on "Mir," would create a
logical counterweight to this jurisdiction.86)
Regarding the exemplary French astronaut on
"Mir," that would mean that he would fall, for all his
commercial activities as well as for other activities,
under the jurisdiction of the successor to the Soviet
Union, and would have to submit to the latter's laws,
including its system of private international law (as
far as that would exist and apply). The French state
on the basis of his nationality would only retain the
residual jurisdiction over nationals and the right of
offering diplomatic protection in case it does not
agree to a specific Soviet legal action, as a corollary
to the responsibility of France under Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty for its national activities. 8?)
A much more complex situation will arise in cases
of structural and permanent international involvement in space stations, where the need for redefinition of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is shown
even more forcefully.88) The most interesting example in point is provided for by "Freedom," where,
it being a truly international space station, multiple
jurisdictions come into play. The basis in this respect

is provided for by the Intergovernmental Agreement
(or lOA). The liability regime, a problem of its own
regarding "Freedom" as well, will not be dealt with
here. 89)
The lOA provides through Article 5 (1) that, in
accordance with Article II of the Registration Convention, the United States and Japan each register
their own modules, part of "Freedom," whereas the
European Space Agency (ESA), having accepted the
rights and obligations of the Registration Convention
in accordance with its Article VII, registers the
European module, "Columbus." Article 5 (2) consequently apportions jurisdiction and control over
those modules; ESA having the task of dealing within
its framework with the problem of not being a sovereign entity used to, and fit for, exercising jurisdiction.90) This jurisdiction and control moreover under
Article 6 (1) has been closely linked to ownership,
which in respect of the station's elements belongs by
definition to the respective states of registry.
A complication however immediately arises,
which indeed makes clear that any jurisdiction to be
exercised can only be quasi-territorial and quasisovereign, and that any contract or other commercially relevant action on board of the space station
cannot be that simply allocated to one jurisdiction to
the exclusion of others.
Article 5 (2) of the lOA in its first sentence provides for an important alternative basis of jurisdiction: partners also "retain jurisdiction and control
( ... ) over personnel in or on the Space Station who
are its nationals." As such, this is a common
phenomenon on earth too, where very often in a like
manner both the territorial jurisdiction of one state
and the jurisdiction of another state over its nationals
are seen to apply. On earth, usually the territorial
jurisdiction is granted priority: for contractl~allaw as
much as tort law the lex loci is usually applied unless
specific reasons would make application of other
jurisdictions more logical, and in criminal law overriding importance of territorial jurisdiction is also the
rule.9l)
On space station "Freedom," however, that would
not be the case to the same extent, as "[t]he exercise
of [any] jurisdiction and control shall be subject to
any relevant provisions of this Agreement, the MOUs
and implementing arrangements." What relevant
provisions can be distinguished in the lOA? The
special case created for criminal jurisdiction92) is the
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most explicit exception to the general principles of
Article 5 (2), but of little relevance for our subject.
More important for our purpose are Articles 7, 9
and 10 of the IGA. Article 7 provides for the system
'of management of the various programs to be conducted on board the space station. Responsibility for
management and direction of the programmes of the
United States and the planning for and direction of
day-to-day-operation of the US registered modules
(respectively in the line of some sort of personal
jurisdiction over nationals, juridical or natural, and
(quasi-)territorial jurisdiction) as well as for overall
programme coordination, direction of the space
station, and establishment of overall safety requirements and plans, is delegated to the United States. 93 )
Subsidiarily to those provisions, the other partners
shall each be responsible for management and direction of their own programmes and utilization activities94); which would suggest an element of personal
jurisdiction as counterpart to such responsibility.
Elements of (quasi-)territorial jurisdiction for the
other partners are notably absent; they can only find
some sort of a basis by going back to Article 5 (2),
first part of the first sentence, and Article 6 - or by
going on to the subsidiary Article 10.95 )
This construction seems to suggest that commercial activities on the space station are not simply dealt
with by the law of the partner on whose registered
space station-element that activity takes place. Even
taking aside the problems in respect of ESAregistered-elements, where additional measures would
be necessary to create applicability of certain legal
rules of one national European legal system or
another, and also taking aside the question of
whether a partner's domestic legal system provides
for its own extension in a relevant measure to a piece
of steel floating in outer space, the special responsibilities of the United States are worth nothing.
Business on the Japanese Experiment Module would
need to reckon with safety requirements with regard
to the space station as a whole, as promulgated by the
United States, which seems to possess thus, under
certain circumstances, the power to overrule or
nullify contracts when it comes to the crunch.
Article 9 provides for the basic legal framework
for utilization in respect of the space station. It does,
in the first instance, simply divide "the use" of the
various modules between the space station's partners
by way of establishing fixed percentages. 96) Espe-
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cially relevant for enterprise interested in doing business is paragraph 8. It provides that basically each
partner may use itself, or select users including of
course private ones, for its allocations under the first
six paragraphs and the related MOUs to its own
discretion - but: subject to "the object of this
Agreement and the provisions set forth in the MOUs
and implementing arrangements."
Two additional caveats are further made. The first
means that a private entity under the jurisdiction of
a non-partner to the space station (or that non-partner
itself) proposing to use an element of "Freedom" will
find that its proposal is dependent upon notification
to all partners, and, more importantly, upon concurrence of the partner whose element is concerned and,
as far as the Attached Pressurized Module of ESA or
the Japanese Experiment Module are concerned, also
of the United States?7) Which means for instance,
that a Korean entity willing to do business on the
JEM, even when its partner is a Japanese company,
is dependent upon American consent to do so. In
terms of our earthly parameters, this means that a
certain module is considered to be quasi-American territory as well as quasi-Japanese or quasi-European,98)
which once more reflects the basic caveats to the use
of (quasi-) territorial jurisdiction in regard of space
stations.
The second caveat deals with the interpretation of
the peaceful purpose which is binding upon all space
station users. It is the partner providing a certain
element which determines whether a certain activity
taking place on it is indeed for peaceful purposes.99)
This means e.g. that a European weapons manufacturer has more chance to do business on the
American module than on the European module,
given the tendency on the American side to interprete
peaceful purposes much more broadly,l°O)
Then as to Article 10, it does to a certain extent
elaborate upon Article 7's provisions, focussing on
the development and implementation of safety procedures as a consequence of the responsibilities which
the partners have "in the operation of the elements
they respectively provide." Article 10, being much
shorter than Article 7, is also much simpler: no
specific case is created for the United States however: Article 10 is subsidiary to Article 7,101) It
effectively means that business enterprises should
look at both the overall safety responsibilities of the
United States, and the specific safety requirements
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issued by the partner whose element is concerned, as
those responsibilities may turn out to be matched by
regulations providing for jurisdiction in rem as to
contracts or products fabricated on board.
In conclusion, it can be said here that the basic
legal framework for commercial activities on board
space stations is indeed provided for by a quasiterritorial regime of jurisdiction by the registration
state, if the space station is a one-nation undertaking
(even if some international involvement is present),
whereas the truly international example of "Freedom,"
having a set of registration states (including even one
international organization), by way of the lOA
created an intricate system of both quasi-territorial
and personal jurisdictions - the former however in
general still being the more important ones.
Thus, even leaving aside questions of liabilitY,102)
it seems to make sense also to adequately redefine
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in the direction
of general public international law, where the other
side of the coin of territorial jurisdiction is provided
for by the basic international responsibility of a state
for everything happening on its territory which can
potentially violate or harm interests or rights of other
states.
7. Freedome to Damage? - Legal Aspects
of Liability in Regard of the International
Space Station
Finally, a few words more must be said on the
issuee of liability, as it specifically relates to "Freedom"; because it, among others, very well shows the
logic of applying the principle of territoriality to
space stations. The general liability regime for space
activities has already been indicated,103) and to a
certain extent also applies to the space station "Freedom."104) Article 16 and 17 of the lOA provide for
this regime in regard of our only example so far of an
international space station. What they effectively do,
is make a distinction in the sense of creating one
regime for cases of damage arising where only
partners to the space station (or their entities)105) are
involved, which are dealt with by Article 16, and one
regime for cases where damage caused to, or by, third
parties is involved, which are dealt with by Article 17.
Article 16 provides for a cross waiver of liability,
which amounts to a waiver of liability in case of
claims involving more than one partner or its entities,

including claims based on delict, tort and condUCt. 106) Thus, damage falling under the lOA caused
by the US government to the Japanese government,
or vice versa, can not entail liability for such damage.
Neither, seemingly, can damage for instance caused
by the US government to the Japanese Shimizu
Corporation or vice versa, by Shimizu Corporation
to a European, Canadian or US company involved in
the space station undertaking or vice versa, or by the
Canadian Ministry of State for Science and Technology to Shimizu or vice versa, entail such liability.
On the other hand, questions of liability 'within
one partner' do not fall under Article 16.1°7) In
respect of the US, Japanese and Canadian partners,
this is logical, as such questions would seem to fall
within one domestic jurisdiction or other. 108) As to
the European partner, ESA not being a sovereign
with monolithic jurisdiction, it leads to problems, as
claims between two European member states, one
such member state and entities of other member
states, or entities of different member states, do not
fall under the cross waiver.109)
Important furthermore in this respect is the
definition of "damage" as provided for by the lOA,
and the related notion of "Protected Space Operations." "Damage" is defined very broadly, as it encompasses not merely every kind of personal injury
and damage to, losse of, or loss of use of property,
but also loss of revenue or profits and other direct,
indirect or consequential damage.J lO) The cross
waiver of Article 16 applies in rem to all these kinds
of damage.
Moreover, these kinds of damage do not only
relate to actual operation of the space station, even
including the launching phase, but also to "research,
design, development, test, manufacture, assembly,
integration (... ) of launch or transfer vehic)es (... ),
the Space Station, or a payload, as well as related
support equipment and facilities and services," and
moreover to "all activities related to ground support,
test, training, simulation, or guidance and control
equipment and related facilities or services," as all
these activities fall under the definition of "Protected
Space Operations,"lll) and thus under the cross
waiver.J 12)
In conclusion as to this point, it may be said that
as between partners to the undertaking of building
and operating "Freedom," and their entities, there is
indeed to a large extent 'freedom to damage.' It goes
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so far, that even a breach of contract between entities
of different partners as to research or development
can not entail liability, and damages can not be
awarded. For entities, commercial or not, private or
'not, involved in any kind of space station-related
activity, that will be a very important problem indeed.
One final point in this regard has to be elaborated
upon a little further: the definition of "related
entity."Il3) So far, it has been suggested that the
relation between a partner and "its" entity hinges
simply on nationality. An entity, whether corporate
or institutional, having US nationality, is suggested
to be an US entity for the purpose of the IGA automatically; claims against the US by such an entity
would remain 'internal,' claims against e.g. Canada
be 'international' in the sense of falling under the
cross waiver.
Things are not really that simple however. In the
IGA, "related entity" is defined as "a contractor or
subcontractor of a Partner State at any tier," "a user
or customer of a Partner State at any tier" or "a
contractor or subcontractor of a user or customer of
a Partner State at any tier" (emphasis added). The
(repeated) use of the word "of" in fact points to a
link between a partner state and its related entity
existing through the partner state in question contracting the entity in question.
This does not sound as a territorial link (nor as a
nationality-based one); seemingly, it is through the
contract that the entity becomes an entity under the
umbrella of a state for the purpose of the cross
waiver,114) which would mean that Fokker, if contracted by the Japanese government, becomes a
Japanese related entity to that extent, instead of a
Dutch or ESA-related one. Potential damage to
Fokker caused by Japan thus would not fall under
the cross waiver but instead under the applicable
national Japanese liability regime, whereas such
damage caused by the Netherlands, alternatively
ESA,115) would be covered by Article 16 of the IGA.
Likewise, a contract between two entities can be
'identified' in this regard. If Shimizu subcontracts
General Dynamics for part of its contribution to the
Japanese Experimental Module, General Dynamics
would be a "related entity" of Japan through its
being a subcontractor of Shimizu and the latter's
contract with NASDA, and claims for damages
between Shimizu and General Dynamics would thus
fall under Japanese law. 116)
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In practice, most related entities contracted by a
partner, a state or its cooperating agency, as much as
the entities subcontracted by the contractors, will be
entities with the nationality of that state - usually,
that is, registered and/or having their 'siege social' in
that state. 117) This means, that de facto perhaps it
will usually still be a case of territoriality deciding on
the applicable liability regime; the special IGAregime becoming applicable as a kind of "astrolaw"118) already, although not solely related to the
realm of outer space, in case of more territorial
jurisdictions than one being involved through the
nationality of the entities concerned.
Furthermore, a contract between a state and a
foreign entity may also be envisaged, and often is,
under the terms of the contract or under private international law, as effectively being concluded on the
territory of the state; thus territorial jurisdiction
might be seen to be applicable, if not in personam, at
least in rem, to this issue as well. Mutatis mutandis,
the same applies to contracts between two entities.
All this, however, does not deride from the fact that
de jure the link seems still to be provided for by the
contractual relation; this seems to be an important
flaw in the logic of the legal framework of "Freedom." If the cooperation under the IGA is going to
be truly international underneath the state-level as
well, such cooperation among entities of different
nationality has to face a serious obstacle here. It
would mean namely, that in each case of an entity
thus becoming involved with a foreign state, liability
for damage would not be cross waived as far as the
intercontractual relationship was concerned. On the
other hand, however, the Japanese government for
instance would thus not be able to issue a claim for
damage incurred by Shimizu Corporation in the
course of the latter's engagement by NASA, because
for the purpose of that engagement Shimizu would be
a related entity of the United States and not of Japan.
Neither cold the US government claim from Japan,
if Shimizu damaged US property, for Japan is not the
launching state in this respect and thus can never be
held liable under the Liability Convention. 119)
Shimizu on the other hand could claim, but could
most probably only do so under US legislation and
jurisdiction, as the Liability Convention excludes
from its own scope cases of damage occurring to
foreign nationals involved in the launching,120)
Under its own liability laws it is the US government
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which likewise could sue Shimizu, should the damage
have been caused by the latter to the former. As to
damage caused to, or by, third parties, things lie
differently altogether. Article 17 of the lOA simply
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Article
16, the Partner States, as well as ESA, shall remain
liable in accordance with the Liability Convention."121) Furthermore, paragraphs 2 and 3 deal with
the consequences of a third state claiming one or
more partners to "Freedom" to be liable. Thus, as is
logical, rights of third states as to forwarding claims
for damage caused by activities related to the space
station-undertaking, have not been abrogated by the
lOA-structure, and consequently here no 'freedom to
damage' has been allowed for. To what extent 'freedom to damage' remains for private entities, once
more depends upon domestic legislation. This, of
course, makes it quite interesting indeed for states to
create or apply such legislation, and may convince
them to do so.
In view of the jurisdictional question this leads us
to the conclusion that the specific lOA-regime does
not deviate from our analysis with regard to the
importance of (quasi-)territoriality as the primary
basis for jurisdiction to any great extent. In regard of
damage caused by space station-activities to third
parties as much as vice versa, the normal liabilityregime as dealt with 122) remains in force. This kind
of damage will as a matter of fact also be of the
traditional sort, external from a space station-point
of view in the sense of that space object somehow
damaging another space object. The fundamental
weakness of the close link of liability to the (or a)
launching state in view of the planned long lifetime
of "Freedom" remains to the same extente. Once
more it is worthwhile to ask in this respect whether it
would not be better to change the structure of this
regime in the direction of applying traditional (quasi-)
territorial jurisdiction, and subsidiarily nationalitybased jurisdiction, to space stations in respect of
liability-problems as well. 123)
A change has however on the contrary been
achieved in regard of the other category of damage
which can be imagined, that between partners and/or
related entities. Both in a philosophical, and in a
practical, and in a legal sense as well, such damage
really is damage caused within the framework of the
space station-agreements, and apart from the traditional kind of space object-to-space object damange

can very well encompass what may be labelled
'internal damage.' Therefore it will only have consequences and be relevant within that framework.
Most often, it even indeed will relate to damage occurring physically within the space station itself,124)
In the latter case, as alluded to, the damage can
relate to all kinds of activities which are not specifically space activities in a legal sense, such as a
research contract, or even have nothing to do with
space law, such as the sale of a photo camera. Thus
it is most logical indeed to apply liability regimes, as
a specific field for exercising jurisdiction, on a quasiterritorial basis.
This, for instance, in regard of purely earth-based
commercial activities, by not touching upon them as
long as remaining within one territorial jurisdiction,
and by using territorial jurisdiction as the basic
criterion in case more than one is involved. This,
also, in regard of the whole space station and all
activities exclusively taking place on board, by
creating essentially a specific liability-regime for the
total of those activities, whereby the whole of the
space station for the purpose of liability, even in
respect of its physical presence in outer space, turns
out to be some sort of internationalized quasiterritory. The concrete filling-in of this liabilityregime, in the sense of the creation of a comprehensive cros~ waiver for liability, is not important in this
respect - although, of course, for commercial enterprise willing to step on board, it is highly relevant
indeed. The fact however that the liability regime on
board "Freedom" is not in line with the remaining
jurisdictional issues, and not in line with the responsibility-question either, makes a safe comprehensive
legal evaluation very difficult, if not impossible.
8. Pioneers vs. Profiteers - The Special, Issue
of Intellectual Property Rights
There is one special issue which has been left out
of the foregoing analysis, because it does not solely
relate to what is happening on board of a space
station, and as matter of fact even effectively tries to
equate for its purpose activities on the space station
to activities on earth: that of the regime of intellectual
property rights. 125) Any such regime has as its basic
tenet the protection of someone's pioneering and
inventing work against potential parasites prying on
his or her inventions without any accompanying
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trouble, and thereby the stimulation of pioneering
and inventing efforts in the first place. On the other
hand, a pioneer or inventor is not seen as having an
inherent right to an eternal monopoly once having
pioneered or invented something; and the regime is
also in place to strike a balance in this respect. 126)
All this means, that for the regime to be comprehensively effective, it should apply both to inventions
on space stations, in order not to discourage pioneers
on board, and to mimicry on space stations, in order
not to encourage profiteers to dodge earthly restrictions by moving their mimicry to outer space. Although the latter possibility is perhaps for the time
being, due to the cost of producing anything on
board, not really a feasible one, together with its
much more practical complement it underscores the
point that to maximize effectiveness of an intellectual
property rights regime, space stations should be
equated in essence to pieces of territory, and a
(quasi-) territorial approach to its legal framework
seems inescapable.
In regard to one-nation space stations, the solution
is simply to apply, whether by amendment or by
implication, existing intellectual property rights law
to space objects such as the one in question. Thus,
any company interested in becoming active on board,
whether with the nationality of that nation or not,
should figure out whether such a law indeed applies
to the space station. If it does not, a large problem
looms ahead; basically, mimicry would be given free
play.127)
In regard to the really international undertaking of
the space station "Freedom," the above conclusions
nave been confirmed to a large extent. Article 21 of
the IGA deals with these questions,128) and the quasiterritorial approach is very prominent again here.
Thus, according to paragraph 2, for the purpose of
Article 21 "an activity occurring in or on a Space
Station flight element shall be deemed to have
occurred only in the territory of the Partner State of
that element's registry" (emphasis added). A special
provision even pertains to ESA-registered elements to
the effect that the combined territory of the European
participating states is to be viewed, at their discretion,
as a kind of ESA-territory.129) Other provisions of
Article 21, going more into detail as to the application
of patent laws and the like to non-nationals or nonresidents, and the specific problems concerning the
many European states together forming 'Partner
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ESA,'130) do not detract from the conclusion that, as
to intellectual property rights, the legal framework
with regard to "Freedom" is a quasi-territorial one.
It does effectively partition the possibility of
application of the various domestic laws of the states
involved in a manner quite analogous to private international law, the main difference being that in the
case of space stations the basically appropriate
national law does not apply automatically but has to
provide for its own extension, either explicit or implicit, either in itself or by amendment, to the realm
of outer space or at least space stations therein. And
indeed, the United States for one have already
amended their domestic intellectual property legislation to the extent of incorporating inventions made
on board of the American-registered elements of the
space station,131)
As to the European situation, already in the ESA
Convention it was stated as to the subject of intellectual property rights in general that "the Agency
shall, with regard to the resulting inventions and
technical data, secure such rights as may be appropriate for the protection of its interests, of those of
the Member States participating in the relevant
programme, and of those of persons and bodies
under their jurisdiction."132) Apparently this resulted
in a system, applicable to space station inventions
and data, which made of Europe (read: the Europe
of the European Space Agency's member states) one
territory for the purpose of intellectual property
rights, also dubbed "royalty-free licensing rights for
space applications in Europe,"133) excluding from
this sector applicability of any specific national intellectual property rights regime which, if applied on
their own, might risk being circumvented or made
useless through their limited territorial coverage, and
otherwise would confuse the issue.
As to data rights and technology transfer impediments, likewise a quasi-territorial extension of nationallegislations is, if not as of yet provided for, at
least sought after. 134) Related issues of import and
export regulations are even intrinsically linked to
"territory" in one form or another. 135) And, as was
shown, the registration system of space stations,
whether in general or with regard to "Freedom" in
particular, through its apportionment of jurisdiction
allows indeed for such possibilities.
In conclusion, it may be said that both as to
national and as to international space stations, the
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best way to deal with intellectual property rights and
the road indeed followed in practice, basically would
be and is to follow along the lines of (quasi-) territoriality and private international law as it functions on earth. In any given example, that is where to
look for when worrying about investments of time
and money in inventions being protected against
profiteers.
9. The Territorial Approach, Domestic Legislation
and Private International Law - A Pandora's Box
With the helpe of the territoriality-approach as
applied in the foregoing analysis, finally perhaps a
provisional conclusion may be formulated as to the
legal aspects of commercialization in respect of space
stations, or rather the basic legal framework for such
commercialization, clarifying to what extent the
Journey into the Unknown for a commercial enterprise, whether private or public, risks opening a
Pandora's Box.
The first important distinction is that between
what basically is a one-nation-space station, with
"Mir" as its prominent example, and a truly international station, of which "Freedom" should become the prime example. The one-nation-stations
will usually be registered by one state and thus fall
under one jurisdiction, which quasi-territorially overrules any other jurisdiction possibly applicable.
Whether it concerns taxation, import and export
legislation, liability or intellectual property rights
regimes, tort or contract law, an entity planning to do
business will need to take a look at one national legal
system only, and consequently plan its actions,
including perhaps negotiating specific arrangements
on specific points. It does not really matter whether
the pre-operational phase or the operational phase is
concerned; only as to the liability regime existing
international space law can become directly relevant,
somewhat in deviation of the territorial approach.
As to international space stations, the sole
example currently existing bodies ill. The specific
regime created does in some instances half-heartedly
apply quasi-territoriality to space stations. It will be
clear that a quasi-territorial approach, if comprehensively applied, would have many advantages, especially as to legal clarity in respect of those willing to
do business. The fact however that precisely such
comprehensiveness is missing, wherefore the quasi-

territorial approach becomes mixed with other approaches to a different extent in regard of different
issues such as liability and intellectual property
rights, and of different phases of space stationundertakings, makes business indeed a risky affair in
legal terms - and this holds good, to be sure, to a
certain extent already in the only phase so far realized,
that of construction and development.
For each issue and each phase, a different legal
framework arises, pieces of public international law,
present or absent national legislation, both in direct
and in indirect ways relevant for space activities, and
so-called private international law mixing in constantly changing fashion. For lawyers perhaps this is
paradise, for the entities who have to pay them
however it will be much less so - but can they go
ahead regardless, without those lawyers.
Thus the question remains: Pandora's Box? In
respect of the international space station, it may well
seem to be. Although the launching phase has not
even started yet, the undertaking is already in severe
danger of being restructured to smallness, or perhaps
to oblivion; whereas the billions of dollars, yen,
marks and guilders already invested in research and
development have already begun to hurt more than
one entity involved - both states and companies.
Thus, already some disease seem to have escaped
from the box.
The only, radical, solution in my opinion would be
the legal vaccination of application of quasi-territoriality, because this would make clear internationally
speaking where responsibility and liability in whatever sense are to be found. Thus it would of itself
necessitate the states involved to take care of their
own interests in those respects by creating domestic
legislation to fill in the framework, thus making outer
space into an environment for commercial enterprise
legally similar to their own respective territories.
The approach of "astro-Iaw," of creating a specific
kind of private international law for the internationalized area of outer space is the only alternative
medecine, but has the disadvantage of being not
comprehensive to begin with. More importantly, due
to the inescapable influence of concepts of territorial
and national jurisdictions which already exist and
which will certainly remain if not indeed grow more
dense in application, the result would probably be an
even greater patchwork than that currently existing.
The effort to create something like a specific body of
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private law for "Freedom" seems a case in point.
In view of the fact finally, that Pandora's Box has
already been opened, despite sincere warnings to the
contrary, it is not useful any longer to merely recog.nize the fact and keep cursing it; cursing has never
cured disease. What may help, however, is analysis
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and diagnosis, and start developing legal medicines
for those diseases that are with us now, and start
thinking about potential future diseases. If that is
done properly, even Pandora's Box may in the end
have been worth opening.

NOTES
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The project of the international space station
"Freedom" is legally based in the first place upon the
27-Article Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), made
on Sept. 29 1988. The IGA has not yet entered into
force, as only Japan, Germany, Denmark, Norway and
the Netherlands, out of 13 signatory states, have ratified
(see for the rules regarding entry into force Art. 25).
Secondly, therefore, the 7-Paragraph Interim Arrangement of Sept. 29, 1988, which is in force, is legally
relevant, providing for the legal regime applicable prior
to entry into force of the IGA. This especially, since,
thirdly, three Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's)
are already in place and in force between NASA on the
one hand, and ESA, STA (the Japanese Space and
Technology Agency) and MOSST (the Canadian
Ministry of State for Science and technology) respec-

tively on the other hand.
For the technical and operational framework, see
further Artt. 1,6-10 and the Annex of the IGA; Manned
Space Stations, pp.99-ll4; Cambridge Encyclopedia,
pp.302-312; A.J. Young, Law and Policy in the Space
Stations' Era, DOrdrecht etc., 1989, pp.18-63. Basically, for the space station itself, as opposed to free flying
elements, the United States were to provide the
habitation module and a laboratory module, ESA's
contribution dubbed "Columbus" was to consist of
another laboratory, sometimes called the Attached
Pressurized Module (APM), Japan was also to contribute its own laboratory, called Japanese Experiment
Module (JEM), whereas Canada does not provide part
of the station's space but a Mobile Servicing System
including a Remote Manipulator System.
7) See e.g. Space News, June 10-16, 1991, p.ll, Also
Manned Space Stations, pp.81-88; Cambridge Encyclopedia, pp.296-298; Young, pp.13-18. "Mir," however, is
not untroubled as an environment for commercial
activities either: since the recent developments in the
Soviet Union have already lead to a demise of that
Soviet Union, problems arise on the horizon as to what
republic(s) or state(s) will take over, and consequently
what (as of yet most probably non-existent) law system
will apply to "Mir." On the one hand, a Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) has taken the place of the
Soviet Union in international politics as of December
1991, encompassing 11 of the 15 republics of the latter
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of space activities (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and
Kazakhstan) .
On the other hand, this Commonwealth clearly is no
sovereign state, at least not as of yet: it has no constitution, no international legal personality and almost
no central organs, it merely consists of a set of different
agreements between the sovereign republics who are the
ones with real international legal personality. One of
these agreements, the most important for our purpose,
is the Minsk Space Agreement (see Aerospace Daily,
Jan. 7, 1992, pp.31-32, for the English text) signed on
December 30. 1991, and in force as of that date. In this
Agreement, to which only 9 republics are a party
(amongst others, the Ukraine abstained), it was agreed
to continue the former Soviet Union's space efforts in
more or less unchanged fashion, while taking into
account the changed political structure. No specific
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with respect to "Mir" and not in other fields, and it still
remains to be seen therefore how for instance jurisdictional, liability - and registration - problems are
going to be solved.
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Qizhi, Annales, p.334, focussing on "strictly private
ownership and operation," which should thus be interpreted as applying to a product or service both before its
sale (i.e.: pointing to the seller) and after (i.e.: pointing
to the buyer); Silvestrov, p.91, who even states that
"[p]rivatization itself does not create something new in
principle."
Cf. also Ahearn, pp.55-57.
Out of the extensive literature on commercialization in
general, again I point to Tatsuzawa, Proceedings 31st;
Bourely, Annales; Van Traa, Dissertation; Rzymanek;
He Qizhi, Annales; furthermore G.S. Robinson & P.L.
Meredith, "Domestic Commercialization of Space: the
Current Political Atmosphere," American Enterprise,
the Law, and the Commercial Use oj Space, Vol. I,
Washington, 1986, pp.1-29; K.H. B6ckstiegel, "Commercial Space Activities: Their Growing Influence on
Space Law," Annals oj Air and Space Law XII (1987),
pp.175-192; H.L. van Traa-Engelman, "Commercial
Utilization of Outer Space - Legal Aspects," Proceedings oj the Thirty-Second Colloquium on the Law oj
Outer Space, Malaga, 11-15 October 1989, published
Washington, 1990, ppA17-425; K.H. B6ckstiegel, "Reconsideration of the Legal Framework for Commercial
Space Activities," Proceedings oj the Thirty-Third
Colloquium on the Law oj Outer Space, Dresden, 6-12
October 1990, published Washington, 1991, pp.3-1O; B.
Reijnen, "International Law and Business in Space - in
Europe," Proceedings oj the Thirty-Third Colloquium
on the Law oj Outer Space, Dresden, 6-12 October 1990,
published Washington, 1991, pp.68-73.
As to the question of private enterprise, already Art.
VI of the Outer Space Treaty speaks of "non-governmental entities" undertaking activities in outer space in
such a way that its lawfulness is implied. Communist
resistance against allowing private enterprise in space,
especially as far as not matched by a large measure of
"authorization and continuous supervision," has disappeared during the last few years. See also e.g. H.M.
White, "The Private Law of Space: An Evolutionary
Imperative," American Enterprise, the Law and the
Commercial Use oj Space, Vol. III, Washington, 1987,
pp.16-17; and as reminiscent of the old attitude: G.
Zhukov & Y. Kolosov, International Space Law, New
York, 1984, pp.65-66; M. Howald, "Private Space Activities and National Legislation," Proceedings oj the
Thirty-Second Colloquium on the Law oj Outer Space,
Malaga, 11-15 October 1989, published Washington,
1990, pp.344-347.
See the discussion supra, at note 12.
See the efforts at defining the notion of "space station,"
sometimes very tentatively indeed, in e.g. C.Q. Christol,
The Modern International Law oj Outer Space, New
York etc., 1982, p.6; Zhukov & Kolosov, p.154, quoting
the Final Acts of the 1971 WARC which however at the
most provide for a partial definition (and an obvious one
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at that); Young, pp.3-4, quoting La. James M. Beggs'
rather extensive definition; Manned Space Stations
pp.29 ff.; J.J. Dordain, "Les Caracteristiques Techniques et les Fonctions des Divers Types de Stations
Spatiales," Manned Space Stations - Legal Issues,
ESA Publication SP-305, Jan. 1990, p.19; S. Gorove,
"The US/International Space Station: Legal Aspects of
Space Objects and Jurisdiction and Control," Manned
Space Stations - Legal Issues, pp.27-29; S. Gorove,
Developments in Space Law, Dordrecht etc., 1991,
pp.316-318; K. Tatsuzawa, "The International Cooperation on the Space Station," Proceedings of the ThirtyThird Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Dresden,
6-12 October 1990, published Washington, 1991,
pp.250-251.
"Mir" had a core configuration which was launched in
February 1986, while later elements such as "Kvant"
were added by later launches, making "Mir" by 1990
with some 90 tons more than three times as heavy as the
core configuration in itself; Manned Space Stations,
pp.81-83; Cambridge Encyclopedia, pp.296-298.
"Freedom" was, before the current budget and
restructuring plans, planned to be assembled in space.
The first element's launch was due in March 1995 and
through some further twenty or so US Space Shuttle
flights, each adding their own piece of the ultimate 200
tons which the station was supposed to weigh, complete
assembly was supposed to take place in August 1999.
Planned launch date for the first element and planned
date for final assembly at the moment are still uncertain; cf. also Manned Space Stations, pp.I11-113.
See e.g. M. Akehurst, "Jurisdiction in International
Law," British Yearbook ofInternational Law 46 (197273), p.145; D.W. Bowett, "Jurisdiction: Changing
Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources,"
British Yearbook of International Law 53 (1982), p.l;
EA. Mann, "The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction
Revisited after Twenty Years," Further Studies in International Law, Oxford, 1990, pp.4-5.
See e.g. R. DalBello, "Jurisdiction, Intellectual Property
and Tort Law Aboard the Space Station," American
Enterprise, the Law and the Commercial Use of Space,
Vol. III, Washington, 1987, pp.42-45, 59-64.
Cf. e.g. Art. 4, Draft articles on State responsibility, Part
One, International Law Commission, II-2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, UN Doc. A/35/1O (1980); I. Brownlie,Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford,
1979, pp.33-38; M.N. Shaw, International Law, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge, 1986, pp.97-102; M. Akehurst, A Modern
Introduction to International Law, 5th ed., London,
1984, p.43.
Sometimes for instance specific treaties can be concluded
arranging for these problems; cf. e.g. the air law
conventions dealing with jurisdiction in respect of
hijacking and sabotage acts. See e.g. Shaw, pp.363-364.
See also e.g. P. Dann, "The Future Role of Municipal
Law in Regulating Space-Related Activities," Space
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41)
42)

43)
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Law: Views of the Future, ed. T.L. Zwaan et aI.,
Dordrecht etc., 1988, pp.125-134.
See e.g. White, pp.14-30 esp.; Tatsuzawa, Proceedings
31st, p.341, pp.345-347.
Cf. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), done Jan. 27, 1967, entered
into force Oct. 10, 1967, text in 6 ILM 386 (1967), Artt.
VII and VIII; Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter Liability
Convention), done Mar. 29, 1972, entered iJ?to force
Sept. 1, 1972, text in 10 ILM 965 (1971), esp. Art. I (d);
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space (hereafter Registration Convention), done
Jan. 14, 1975, entered into force Sept. 15, 1976, text in
14 ILM 43 (1975), esp. Art. I (b).
See e.g. Gorove, Manned Space Stations-Legal Issues,
p.28.
Cf. Outer Space Treaty, Art. VIII; Registration Convention, e.g. Art. II (2). See also Gorove, Manned Space
Stations-Legal Aspects, pp.29-31.
Cf. Outer Space Treaty, Art. VII; Liability Convention,
Art. I (c); Registration Convention, Art. I (a).
Cf. e.g. Artt. 5 and 22, IGA.
Cf. e.g. Brownlie, pp.305-306; Shaw, pp.346-352;
367-370; Akehurst, Modern Introduction, pp.49-50.
See e.g. text at notes 18 and 19.
See literature at note 18.
See Art. VII, Outer Space Treaty, and Liability Convetnion, respectively Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty.
See further infra, Chapter 5.
Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty.
See supra, literature at note 29.
See for an extensive survey of problems and risks
confronting as an example US enterprise in terms of US
government legislation and policy: Ahearn, pp.56-66.
See infra, Chapter 7.
Art. I (a), Liability Convention.
See Artt. II, III, IV (1), VII (a), VIII and IX, Liability
Convention.
See supra, text at note 23.
See Art. 16, IGA; also discussion, infra, Chapter 7.
On the doctrine of state immunity under general international law, see e.g. I. Sinclair, "The Law of Sovereign
Immunity. Recent Developments," Recueil des Cours 167
(1980-I1), pp.197-200 (speaking of "sovereign immunity"); R. Higgins, "Certain Unresolved Aspects of
the Law of State Immunity," Netherlands International
Law Review 29 (1982), pp.265-276; H. Steinberger,
"State Immunity," Encyclopedia ofPubiic International
Law, Vol 10, Amsterdam etc., 1987, pp.428-446.
On the issue as to what extent "nature" respectively
"purpose" of an act are relevant for its qualification as
an act "jure gestionis," see e.g. Sinclair, pp.210-213;
Higgins, pp.267-269; Steinberger, pp.438-439.
See e.g. He Qizhi, "Legal Aspects of Commercialization
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45)
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48)
49)

50)
51)

52)

53)

54)
55)

CHAPTER IV
of Space Activities," Proceedings of the Thirty-Third
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Dresden, 6-12
October 1990, published Washington, 1991, p.60; Van
Traa, Dissertation, pp.236-238.
I.H.P. Diederiks-Verschoor, "Similarities With and
Differences Between Air and Space Law Primarily in
the Field of Private International Law," Recueil des
Cours 172 (1981-III), p.387.
Art. I (c), Liability Convention, and Art. I (a), Registration Convention, provide for a fourfold definition:
the state which launches, or procures the launching, or
from whose territory or facility the space object is
launched.
See for an analysis of Art. 16, IGA, infra, Chapter 7.
See once more infra, Chapter 7.
Thus, US anti-trust law would apply to contracts and
the like between two or more US entities, see Dal Bello;
White, p.24; whereas Art. 85, 86 and 90 of the EEC
Treaty would apply to entities in EC member states;
Treaty Establishing the European Community (BEC
Treaty), done March 25,1957, entered into force Jan. 1,
1958, text in 298 UNTS 11.
Liability can also apply e.g. to stations already orbitting
for a long time; see discussion infra.
See on liability and the role of damage in this respect in
general e.g. the author's paper presented at the IISL
Colloquium of October 1991, Montreal, to be published
in the Proceedings, 1992. Also, specifically as to "Freedom," Ahearn, p.62.
It does not matter in this respect, where the borderline
with airspace should be drawn. For this topic, see the
discussion e.g. in G.M. Danilenko, "The Boundary
between Air Space and Outer Space in Modern International Law: Delimitation on the Basis of Customary
Law," Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Colloquium on
the Law of Outer Space, Budapest, 10-15 October 1983,
published New York, 1984, pp.7l-75; E. Konstantinov,
"Some Aspects of the Spacial and Functional Delimitation between International Air and Space Law," Proceedings ofthe Twenty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space, Budapest, 10-15 October 1983, published
New York, 1984, pp.81-87; S. Gorove, "The Aerospace
Plane: New Policy Issues for Space Law," Proceedings
of the Thirty-First Colloquium on the Law of Outer
Space, Bangalore, 8-15 October 1988, published
Washington, 1989, pp.282-285.
In respect of the moon and other celestial bodies, a
particular treaty has been concluded: the Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement),
done Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force July 11, 1984,
text in Annals of Air and Space Law XV (1990),
pp.334-335.
See Art. I (b), Liability Convention.
See e.g. Robinson & Meredith, pp.2 ff.; G.C. Raclin,
"Going to Work in Space: a Survey of Presently
Availble Launch Systems," American Enterprise, the
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60)
61)
62)

63)
64)

65)

66)

67)

68)

69)

Law, and the Commercial Use of Space, Vol. I,
Washington, 1986, pp,44-69; K. Iserland, "Ten years of
Arianespace," Space Policy 6 (1990), pp.341-343; J.
Johnson-Freese & R. Handberg, "The tortoise and the
tortoise: the new race for space," Space Policy 7 (1991),
p.205; Yanping Chen, "China's space policy - a
historical review," Space Policy 7 (1991), pp.125-127.
See supra, text at note 17.
Cf. e.g. Ahearn, on the possibility of companies planning to do business on "Freedom" contracting other
companies for launching and related services, pp.59-61.
See Ahearn, pp.55 ff..
See supra, note 24.
Artt. II-V, Liability Convention.
Art. I (c), Liability Convention.
Even if, in conformity with Art. XXII, the organization
has acceped the rights and obligations contained in
the Liability Convention, its member states' liability is
really only temporarily suspended: see Art. XXII (3.a)
and (3.b), Liability Convention. ESA has signed the
relevant declaration, which has entered into force on
Sept. 23, 1976.
Cf. e.g. Artt. I (c), II (1) and (2), Registration
Convention.
Cf. also e.g. B.A. Hurwitz, "Liability for Private Commercial Activities in Outer Space," Proceedings of the
Thirty-Third Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space,
Dresden, 6-12 October 1990, published Washington,
1991, pp.37-41.
See on the confusion around the two notions of liability
for damage and state responsibility for internationally
wrongful acts the author's paper presented at the IISL
Colloquium of October 1991; also N.L.l.T. Horbach,
"The Confusion about State Responsibility and International Liability," Leiden Journal of International
Law 4 (1991), pp,47-74.
See for the longstanding discussion on the related definitions of "national activities" and "appropriate state"
(appearing in Art. VI Outer Space Treaty) e.g. Van
Traa, Dissertation, pp,44-48, 205-206; Boun~ly, Annales, pp.I77-178; He Qizhi, Annales, p.337; Bockstiegel, Proceedings 33rd, p.5; also Young, pp.149-151.
Cf. the fourfold definition of "launching state," as
provided by Art. I (c), Liability Convention, and Art.
I (a), Registration Convention.
See Artt. VIII ff., Liability Convention. International
organizations, under Art. XXII, form the only other
possible category of internationally liable entities under
space law. Also Hurwitz, pp.37-40.
See on the various US American space acts, beginning
with the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
e.g. S. Gorove, "The Growth of Domestic Space Law:
A U.S. Example," Journal of Space Law 18 (1990),
pp. 99-111; for the Swedish Act on Space Activities of
1982 and the Outer Space Act of the United Kingdom
of 1968, e.g. J. Reifarth, "Nationale Weltraumgesetze
in Europa," Zeitschriftfiir Luft- und Weltraumrecht 36
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73)

74)
75)

76)
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(1987), pp.3-16; EO. von der Dunk, "The Swedish and
British Space Acts and Private Commercial Enterprise
under Public International Law," Memoria, Conferencia Espacial de las Americas, San Jose, March 1990,
publ. Jan. 1991, Vol. I, pp.336-342.
Supra, Chapter 3.
See for these general international law doctrines e.g.
Brownlie, pp.180-181, 235-236; Shaw, p.242, pp.267268; Akehurst, Modern Introduction, pp.142-145.
Art. II states: "Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty (...)."
It speaks of the exploration and use of outer space, to
be carried out "for the benefit and in the interests of all
countreis," and being "the province of all mankind."
Exploration and use moreover shall be free. See on the
discussion as to whether this amounts to outer space
being the common heritage of mankind as it stands
today, e.g. A.A. Cocca, "Environment as a Common
Heritage of Mankind," Proceedings of the ThirtySecond Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space,
Malaga, 11-15 October 1989, published Washington,
1990, pp.71-76; V.M. Postyshev, "Outer Space for the
Benefit of Mankind," Proceedings ofthe Thirty-Second
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Malaga, 11-15
October 1989, published Washington, 1990, pp.18-19;
Zhu Qiwu, "Some Reflections on the Most Important
Principle of Outer Space Law: To the Common Interests of All Mankind," Proceedings ofthe Thirty-Second
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Malaga, 11-15
October 1989, published Washington, 1990, pp.25-30;
E. Konstantinov, "New Development of the "Common
Oood" Conception," Proceedings of the Thirty-Third
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Dresden, 6-12
October 1990, published Washington, 1991, pp.227-230.
The moon and other celestial bodies and their resources are, on the contrary, explicitly stated to be
"common heritage of mankind"; Art. 11 (1) (j0. Art. I
(1)), Moon Agreement; on the other hand of course so
far only few states, and none of the larger space powers,
have ratified the Moon Agreement, wherefore its legal
value may be sincerely doubted.
Cf. also White, p.28.
See e.g. Brownlie, pp.242-243, 254-255, 319-320,
424-426; Shaw, pp.317-319. Up to a certain extent it
would also hold good in respect of ships in territorial
waters; e.g. Brownlie, pp.203-209; Shaw, pp.307-308.
See e.g. Brownlie, pp.426-428; Akehurst, Modern
Introduction, p.288. Up to a certain extent it would also
apply to airplanes in foreign airspace; e.g. Brownlie,
pp.121-122, 319-320; Akehurst, Modern Introduction,
p.288.
See also Young, pp.152-153.
The link is provided for by registration in both cases; see
citations notes 75 and 76.
Art. II (1) and (2), Registration Convention, respectively.
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80) See on the issue of these two notions e.g. Tatsuzawa,
Proceedings 31St, pp.343-345; Dal Bello, p.58.
81) See Art. II (2), Registration Convention.
82) See e.g. Akehurst, British Yearbook, pp.179-212;
Bowett, p.1; Mann, pp.3-18; also White, p.28; Dal
Bello, pp.42-46, 50-52; Oorove, Manned Space
Stations-Legal Issues, p.30; Ahearn, pp.63-65.
83) Cf. Mann, pp.13-15.
84) Cf. Akehurst, British Yearbook, pp.190-206; also
White, p.36.
85) See e.g. V.S. Vereshchetin, "Mir: A Soviet Space
Station-Some Legal Aspects of International Cooperation," Manned Space Stations-Legal Issues, pp.52-53.
86) See my suggestions on this point, supra, Chapter 5.
87) See discussion supra, Chapter 5, esp. text at notes 65
and 66.
88) See e.g. Dal Bello, pp.46-49.
89) See infra, Chapter 7.
90) Cf. once more Art. II (2), Registration Convention. So
far, to my knowledge they have not yet taken measures
to deal with these problems.
91) See Akehurst, British Yearbook, pp.145-257; Bowett,
pp.1-26; Mann, pp.3-83.
92) See Art.22, lOA. Also Oorove, Manned Space StationsLegal Issues, pp.30-3l.
93) Art. 7 (1), lOA.
94) Art. 7 (2), lOA.
95) See infra.
96) Those are, according to the original plans: for the
NASA Laboratory Module USA 97fIJo, Canada 3fIJo; for
the ESA Laboratory Module USA 46fIJo, ESA 51fIJo,
Canada 3fIJo; for the Japanese Laboratory Module USA
46fIJo, Canada 3 fIJo , Japan 51fIJo; for extra NASA equipment USA 97fIJo, Canada 3fIJo; giving a total of USA
71,4fIJo, ESA 12,8fIJo, Canada 3fIJo, Japan 12,8fIJo, which
reflects the budget ratio's; Manned Space Stations,
p.lOl.
97) Art. 9 (8.a), lOA.
98) Canada of course does not have a module; its contribution to "Freedom" consists of the Mobile Servicing System; see supra, note 6.
99) Art. 9 (8.b), lOA.
100) Cf. e.g. R. Loosch, "The International Space StationThe Legal Framework," Manned Space Stations-Legal
Issues, pp.57-58; EK. Schwetije, "The Legal Regime of
the U.S. [sic!] Space Station," Proceedings of the
Thirty-First Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space,
Bangalore, 8-15 October 1988, published Washington,
1989, p.180; Tatsuzawa, Pruceedings 33rd, p.252.
101) Art. 10 reads: "(...) in accordance with Article 7 (...)."
102) As mentioned, these questions form a special regime
even in regard of "Freedom"; see for their discussion
infra, Chapter 7.
103) See supra, Chapter 5.
104) See e.g. M.O. bourely, "La Responsabilite pour Dommages dans Ie Cas des Stations Spatiales," Manned
Space Stations-Legal Issues, pp.35-42; T.L. Zwaan &
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W.W.C. de Vries, "Liability Aspects of the International Space Station Agreement of 29 September 1988,"

the Thirty-Third Colloquium on the Law oj Outer
Space, Dresden, 6-12 October 1990, published Washington, 1991, pp.18-22; Manned Space Stations-Legal
Issues, pp.107-129; l. Reifarth, "Rechtliche Aspekte

Proceedings oj the Thirty-Second Colloquium on the
Law oj Outer Space, Malaga, 11-15 October 1989,
published Washington, 1990, pp.447-448.
105) See the definitions in this regard provided for by Art. 16
(2.a) and (2.b), lOA.
106) Art. 16 (3.a), lOA.
107) See Art. 16 (3.d.1), lOA.
108) Cf. e.g. Ahearn on the US situation, p.63.
109) See Zwaan & De Vries, p.448.
110) Art. 16 (2.c), lOA.
111) Art. 16 (2.f), lOA.
112) Art. 16 (3.a), lOA.
113) Art. 16 (2.b), lOA.
114) See also Zwaan & De Vries, p.448.
115) See the discussion on this issue at Zwaan & De Vries,
p. 448, Also Young, pp.160-162, discussing the NASAESA, NASA-STA and NASA-MOSST MOUs and their
respective Artt. 12 in this respect.
116) Cf. Art. 16 (2.b.1) alternatively (2.b.3), in combination
with Art. 16 (3.a.2) and (3.d.1), lOA.
117) See e.g. Brownlie, pp.421-423, 485-494; Shaw, pp.422423.
118) See supra, text at note 23.
119) See Artt. I (c), II, III and IV, Liability Convention.
120) See Art. VII (b), Liability Convention.
121) Art. 17 (1), lOA. See also Bourely, Manned Space
Stations-Legal Aspects, pp.39-41; Young, pp.156-158.
122) See supra, Chapter 5.
123) Efforts are necessary; however, so far are being made
only in a haphazard way, cf. e.g. Young, p.157.
124) See e.g. Ahearn, pp.62-64.
125) See for the US example: Ahearn, pp.64-65.
126) See e.g. Young, pp.164-171; He Qizhi, Proceedings
33rd, pp.59-60.
127) See once more Ahearn, pp.64-65.
128) See further as to the question of intellectual property
rights and their relevance for the commercial use of
space stations, e.g. D.M. Cameron, "Space and Inventions, the Contracting Environment," Proceedings oj

129)

130)

131)

132)

133)
134)

des Ubereinkommens tiber die Internationale Raumstation," Zeitschrijt jur Lujt-und Weltraumrecht 38
(1989), pp.49-50; Dal Bello, 39-66.
Paragraph 2 states in this respect: "that for ESAregistered elements any European Partner State may
deem the activity [concerned] to have occurred within
its territory."
See Art. 3 (b), lOA, defining "the European Oovernments listed in the Preamble which become parties to
this Agreement, as well as any other European Oovernment that may accede to this Agreement in accordance
with Article 25 (3), acting collectively as one Partner."
See e.g. P.M. Martin, "The Legal Regime of Inventions
in Outer Space," Proceedings oj the Thirty-Second
Colloquium on the Law oj Outer Space, Malaga, 11-15
October 1989, published Washington, 1990, pp.369370, on H.R. 1510, calling it the "Patents in Space Act,"
relating to Section 105 of the Patent Act; DalBello,
pp. 53-59, on H.R. 2725/4316; Ahearn, p.65, La. on
H.R. 2946 calling it in his turn the "Patents in Space
Act," "likely to be enacted"; also Young, pp.171-174.
Art. III (3), Convention for the Establishment of a
European Space Agency (ESA Convention), done May
30, 1975, entered into force Oct. 30, 1980, text in Space
Law-Basic Legal Documents, eds. K.H. Bockstiegel &
M. Benko, C.LI.
Young, p.176.
See e.g. Young, pp.179 ff., D.l. Burnett, "Amendment
of CoCom Rules and the Commercialization of Space,"

Proceedings oj the Thirty-Third Colloquium on the
Law oj Outer Space, Dresden, 6-12 October 1990,
published Washington, 1991, pp.11-17; W.B. Wirin,
"U .S. Restrictions on Space Commerce," Proceedings

oj the Thirty-Third Colloquium on the Law oj Outer
Space, Dresden, 6-12 October 1990, published Washington, 1991, pp.120-130.
135) See e.g. Ahearn, pp.65-66; Wirin, pp.120-130.

